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The U.S. commercial real estate market reached its peak in the late seventies
to early eighties.' Favorable tax laws and aggressive lenders combined to fuel
many new projects. 2 Today, lenders are setting different kinds of records.3 Fore-
closure rates are surging nationwide.4 The cost of bailing out the savings and loan
industry continues to soar. In these tough times lenders meticulously scrutinize
each new loan application and finance only the most solid proposals.6
The lenders' cautious attitude has international implications. Today's opportu-
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1. See Stephen E. Roulac, Don't Rush In, FORBES, Aug. 24, 1987, at 135.
2. See Alan I. Sills et al., Real Estate: Investing in 1987; the Impact of Tax Reform, FIN. WORLD,
Feb. 10, 1987, at 50.
3. See, e.g., Michael Stremfel, Property Foreclosures Soar to Benumbing $250 Million, Los
ANGELES Bus. J., Sept. 9, 1991, at 1, 2 (July 1991 foreclosures in Los Angeles County increased
by 284% over the previous year).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence Aragon, Foreclosures, Bankruptcies Increase, Bus. J.-SAN JOSE, Aug.
3, 1992, at 1 (foreclosures in California continue to surge).
5. See generally Mark D. Fefer, Time to Speed Up the S&L Cleanup, FORTUNE, Nov. 16, 1992,
at 116 (Congress continues to bail out the savings and loan industry).
6. See generally Carol J. Loomis, Banks Face a Nervous New Year, FORTUNE, Dec. 14, 1992,
at 117. Banks' hesitate to extend credit, in part, due to increased bank regulation. See id.
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nities are overseas. Recent political changes in Europe have created unprece-
dented opportunities for foreign investors. Unfortunately, domestic lenders are
hesitant to finance projects in other nations.7
This comment explores opportunities available to foreign investors because of
the privatization of Eastern Europe, specifically in the area of land ownership.
It also investigates possible problems investors can expect to encounter when
purchasing land in Eastern Europe, such as the sufficiency of realty as collateral
for a mortgage loan. Finally, it proposes solutions to overcome the problems
associated with financing land purchases in Eastern Europe.
B. POLITICAL CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE
The cold war is over, and the race for profits has begun. For corporate America
Eastern Europe represents a new frontier of opportunity. Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Slovakia lead the campaign to attract foreign enterprise to
the former Communist bloc.8 For American companies doing business in these
countries, uncertainty accompanies opportunity. 9
Political changes in Eastern Europe provide the backdrop for corporate oppor-
tunities. As democracy gradually replaces communism, capitalism gradually re-
places socialism. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland are moving
toward a market economy. ' 0
From 1948 to 1989 the Communist party dominated the country then kown as
Czechoslovakia. 1 In November 1989 the "Velvet Revolution" broke the grip of
hard-line communism,'2 and Czechoslovakia held free elections for the first
time. 13 On January 1, 1993, two sovereign states, the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, replaced Czechoslovakia.14 With their new political structures the Czech
7. Telephone Interview with Kathleen McGown, Counsel, International Finance Corporation
(Feb. 22, 1993).
8. See infra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 80-277 and accompanying text.
10. The United Nations supports the development of market economies in Eastern Europe.
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CENTER
ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ITS JOINT UNITS: PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1992/L.9 (1992). The Economic and Social Council's Commission on
Transnational Corporations is committed to providing funding and technical support to countries in
the process of privatization. Id.
The United States enacted the Support for East European Democracy Act in November 1989. 22
U.S.C.A. § 5401 (West 1990). The act provided Poland and Hungary with financial and technical
aid to support the growth of their market economies. Id.
11. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia § 1.1, Oct. 14, 1993, available in
Westlaw, 1991 WL 222449 (D.R.T.).
12. Id. § 1.2; Richard Sumann, Investing in Czechoslovakia, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 369,
370 (1991). Student demonstrators initiated the revolution by marching to the Vysehrad national
cemetery in Prague. ROGER EAST, REVOLUTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 57 (1992).
13. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 1.2.
14. Id. § 1.1. Both states agreed to adopt all legislation and honor all treaties of former Czechoslo-
vakia. Id.
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Republic and Slovakia abandoned former Czechoslovakia's inefficient system of
central market planning and reintroduced a market economy. 5 Although Poland
and Hungary have privatized state-owned industries at a faster rate than the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, the better macroeconomic conditions of these new nations
provide a stronger foundation for further privatization.' 6
Hungary, like former Czechoslovakia, saw the fall of communism in 1989.7
In October of that year the Hungarian Parliament adopted a package of democratic
legislation that made Hungary a multiparty parliamentary republic.' 8 Although
private companies have existed on a small scale in Hungary since 1968, experts
expect their numbers to mushroom in response to the political changes.' 9
Recently, to ease the transition into a market economy, the Hungarian Parlia-
ment passed key legislation concerning privatization and deregulation. 20 To its
advantage, Hungary's business framework is more advanced than those of its
Eastern bloc neighbors. 2' For this reason Hungary has attracted more direct
foreign investment than any other country in Eastern Europe. 22 Yet, with unem-
ployment on the rise, analysts question whether the Hungarian people will con-
tinue to support the measures necessary to establish a market economy."
In 1989 voters rejected Communist rule in Poland. 24 Soon after, the Polish
Sejm passed legislation aimed at establishing a market-based economy through
private enterprise. 25 Poland leads the transition of the Eastern bloc to a market-
15. Id. § 1.4. The former Czechoslovak Ministry of Privatization had planned to eventually
privatize all state-owned industries, except those concerning infrastructure operations. Sumann, supra
note 12, at 372. As of 1992 market forces determined 85% of Czechoslovak prices. Id. at 370.
16. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 1.4; Charles M. Cole,
Note, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: An Examination of the Evolving
Legal Framework for Foreign Investment, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 667, 669 (1992).
17. Doing Business in Hungary § 1.1, July 18, 1992, available in Westlaw, 1991 WL 11751
(D.R.T.). In October 1989 Hungary declared itself a republic, rather than a people's republic. East,
supra note 12, at 104.
18. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 1.3. Hungary was the first Eastern bloc country
to introduce market forces into its economy. George Gluck, Foreign Investment in Hungary: An
Overview of Recent Legislation, 12 WHTTIER L. REv. 159 (1991).
19. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 2.3.
20. Coopers & Lybrand, Eastern Europe Business and Investment Guides: Hungary § 3.1, Sept.
24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EEBIG File [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand, Hun-
gary]. The legislation is known as Act XXIV of 1988 on Foreign Investment in Hungary. Act XXIV
of 1988 on Foreign Investment in Hungary, reprinted in HUNGARO PREss, EcONOMIC INFORMATION
(E. Nagy ed., 1989) (distributed by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter Foreign
Investment Act]. The Hungarian Parliament passed it in November 1988, and it came into force on
January 1, 1989. Gluck, supra note 18, at 162.
21. Cole, supra note 16, at 679-80.
22. Id. at 680.
23. Coopers & Lybrand, Hungary, supra note 20, § 3.1.
24. Doing Business in Poland § 1.1, Apr. 9, 1992 available in Westlaw, 1991 WL. 11687
(D.R.T.).
25. Coopers & Lybrand, Eastern Europe Business and Investment Guides: Poland § 3.3, Sept.
24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EEBIG File [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand, Poland].
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based economy.26 Poland was the first Eastern European country to make its
currency internally convertible.27 In 1992 Polish investors established 300,000
new private businesses, most of them in trade and services.2" While progress is
underway throughout Eastern Europe, Poland has made the greatest stride toward
emulating the political and economic structures of the west.29
The current structure of government in Poland closely resembles decentralized
western systems of governance.3 Polish law now recognizes municipalities as
legal entities separate from the state. 3' These municipalities control all matters of
local importance, including private and public property rights. 32 Often, municipal-
ities hold public property formerly under centralized state control.33
The leaders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland realize that
their new political and economic systems will not survive unless fortified by
western investment. 3' As a result almost all legislation targeted at privatization
includes provisions for foreign investment. 35 Government officials hope that many
western businesses will take advantage of these provisions and invest in the new
markets of Eastern Europe. Some businesses already have established offices in
Eastern Europe, and most of them report initial success.36
26. Id. § 2.4. In 1989 market forces determined approximately 50% of prices in the Polish
economy. Philip D. Beck, Investors Benefit from New Polish Laws, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at
17, col. 1. In 1990 this figure increased to 90%. Id. Presently, market forces determine nearly 100%
of Polish prices. Id.
27. Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 3.5.
28. Id. § 3.7.
29. See generally id.
30. Cezary Banasinski, Regional Developments: Poland, 25 INT' L LAW. 771,774 (1991) (pursu-
ant to the Polish Local Government Law of Mar. 8, 1990, 1991, Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws]
[Dz.U.] No. 16, item 95).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Prior to the Local Government Law, the People's Council controlled public land held by
the state. Id.
34. Total gross debt outstanding in former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland averaged $150
billion in 1992. Mihaly Simai, The Emerging New Market Economies and the Evolving New Democ-
racy in Central and Eastern Europe, in 1 CHANGE: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY FOR HUMAN PROGRESS:
POLITICAL CHANGE 227 (1992). The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland must depend
on investment from western nations in order to service their debts. Id. Mihaly Simai believes that
the success of the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe depends on active political, moral, intellectual,
and financial support from the western countries. Id. at 234, 236.
35. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand, Eastern Europe Business and Investment Guides: Czechoslo-
vakia § 4.4, Sept. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EEBIG File [hereinafter Coopers
& Lybrand, Czechoslovakia].
36. Enterprise Credit Corporation (ECC) established an office in Poland last year. American
Banker-Bond Buyer, Investments Detailed in Poland, Hungary, Aug. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, EERPT File. ECC operates fifty-six loan windows across Poland and has trained
seventy-five Polish bankers in commercial lending practices. Id. More than 3,000 loan applications have
already been received from Polish businesses anxious to take advantage of the new market economy.
Id. The Exxon Corporation has committed $8.4 million to open a chain of service stations in Poland.
Roundup, WASH. POST, Jun. 25, 1991, final ed., at C2. Gerber Baby Food has acquired a 60% share
in Poland's Alima, central Europe's largest producer of baby food and juices. American Banker-Bond
Buyer, Gerber Expands to Poland, Oct. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EERPT File.
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C. PRIVATIZATION AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT IN EASTERN
EUROPE
The governments of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland have
all drafted laws to stimulate foreign investment. While these laws vary from
country to country, their premise is the same: encouragement of western invest-
ment. Eastern European leaders recognize the important role of foreign invest-
ment in a market economy.
Before the Velvet Revolution in former Czechoslovakia foreign investors could
enter a joint venture with Czechoslovak partners for the purpose of producing or
selling goods within the country. 7 Initially, few foreign firms took advantage
of joint ventures because the weak economy created unavoidable obstacles.38
Investors also were concerned about the Ministry of Finance's tight regulation of
joint ventures.39 All joint ventures had to be founded on the basis and within
the limits of a permit issued by the ministry. 40 Finally, the then Czechoslovak
government, recognizing the limitations of this rule, modified its joint venture
law.41
In November 1990 the Czechoslovak government excluded the following types
ofjoint ventures from the requirement of obtaining a permit before doing business
in Czechoslovakia: (1) joint ventures with a Czechoslovak partner; (2) joint
ventures where the Czechoslovak partner was a cooperative, if the parties estab-
lished the joint venture after July 1, 1988; and (3) a 100 percent foreign-owned
company. 42 Although these changes made the establishment of foreign-owned
businesses much easier, foreign business owners in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia must still tolerate the growing pains of a new market economy. 3 Resources
are scarce." Nevertheless, the Czech Republic and Slovakia remain attractive
locations for foreign investors because of their favorable laws concerning expro-
priation, 4 repatriation of profits, and corporate tax.46
37. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 3.3.1.
38. Id. Foreign investors found the former Czechoslovakia unattractive because (1) it lacked a
hard currency, (2) majority control of the joint venture was always vested in the hand of a Czechoslovak
citizen, and (3) production resources were unreliable. Id.
39. Id.
40. Creating the Invisible Hand: In One of the Boldest Economic Experiments of Modern Times,
Poland and Czechoslovakia Are Concocting Complicated Plans to Give Away Stakes in Hundreds of
State-owned Companies, THE ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991, at 63-64.
41. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 3.3.1.; see also Sumann,
supra note 18, at 375.
42. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 3.3.1.
43. See Robert G. Kaiser, East Europe: The Moral Muddle After Marx, WASH. PosT, May 19,
1991, final ed., at D1.
44. Id.
45. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
46. Coopers & Lybrand, Czechoslovakia, supra note 35, § 4.4; see also Sumann, supra note 18,
at 375. The attractiveness of the Czech Republic and Slovakia depends on these new states faithfully
honoring the laws and treaties of former Czechoslovakia.
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The situation in Hungary resembles that of former Czechoslovakia. The Hun-
garian Parliament relaxed its laws governing foreign investments shortly after the
fall of hard-line communism.47 In 1988 the Hungarian Government passed the
Foreign Investment Act.48 Among other things, this act provides compensation for
foreign investors if the government expropriates their assets. 49 It also guarantees
foreigners the same treatment as Hungarian nationals when setting up and running
a business. 0 Like the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary gives foreign invest-
ors favorable treatment.51
Poland, following the lead of Hungary and former Czechoslovakia, relaxed
its laws concerning foreign investment.52 Before the Communist Party's fall
from power, the law required foreign investors who wanted to do business in
Poland to enter a joint venture with a Polish partner. 53 The Polish partner had
to be the majority shareholder in the joint venture.54 Now, foreign investors
interested in doing business in Poland can choose one of several corporate
forms. 55 They may establish a wholly owned limited liability or joint-stock
company, or they may enter a joint venture with a Polish partner. 56 The Polish
partner no longer needs to be the majority owner of the venture's equity.57
Poland, like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, has enacted favorable
laws concerning repatriation of profits and expropriation 5 8Collectively, these
47. Coopers & Lybrand, Hungary, supra note 20, § 4. 1.
48. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 20; Gluck, supra note 18, at 162; Coopers & Lybrand,
Hungary, supra note 20, § 4. 1; Cole, supra note 16, at 680. The Foreign Investment Act was amended
in 1990. Id.
49. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 2.5.2; Cole, supra note 16, at 681.
50. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 2.5.2.
51. Id. Tax breaks awarded to foreigners have succeeded in drawing over $1.5 billion in foreign
investment. Id. § 4. 1.1. As expected, however, these tax breaks have always been a point of contention
among domestic businesses. Id.
52. Beck, supra note 26, at 17, col. 1.
53. Doing Business in Poland, supra note 24, § 2.5.1; Beck, supra note 26, at 17, col. 1.
54. Id.
55. The Law of June 14, 1991, On Companies with Participation of Foreign Parties art. 1, 1991
Dz.U. No. 60, item 253, reprinted in 1991 WL 319070 (Polska) [hereinafter Participation Law];
Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 4.2; Beck, supra note 26, at 17, col. 3.
56. Participation Law, supra note 55, art. 1; Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 4.2.
57. Participation Law, supra note 55, art. 1; Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 4.2;
Beck, supra note 26, at 17, cols. 1, 2. State-owned enterprises are an exception to this rule. Foreign
investors must obtain a permit from the Foreign Investment Agency if they wish to purchase more
than a 10% share in a corporation formed from the privatization of a state-owned enterprise. Law
on Privatization of State-owned Enterprises, art. 19(2), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1226, 1235 (1990).
Although a Polish partner no longer needs to be the majority owner of the venture's equity, the Polish
partner may not contribute more than 80 % of the equity upon formation of the joint venture. Matthew
W. Sanidas, The Economic Evolution of Polish Joint Venture Laws, 19 DENv. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y
641, 655 (1991). Further, the value of the U.S. partner's contribution must be at least 25 million
zlotys (about $2,600). Id. Foreign investors must be seriously committed to the success of their
ventures in Poland in order to comply with this rule. Id.
58. Participation Law, supra note 55, art. 22; Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, §
4.2.; Beck, supra note 26, at 17, col. 1.
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changes provide considerable flexibility and opportunity for businesses estab-
lishing offices in Poland.59
By changing their laws the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland
have shown a commitment to foreign investment. Perhaps the most striking change
is in the area of land ownership. Until recently even nationals had difficulty
acquiring real estate in their home countries. 60 Today, most Eastern European
countries allow foreign investors to purchase real estate.
D. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN EASTERN EUROPE
In the Czech Republic and Slovakia prospective investors must obtain govern-
ment permission before purchasing real estate.61 So far, authorities have been
hesitant to allow foreigners to purchase real estate in these countries. 62 Joint
ventures, on the other hand, have had more success buying and selling real estate
because Czech and Slovak law views foreign-owned joint ventures as Czech or
Slovak legal persons.63
Until January 1, 1989, Hungarian companies with foreign participation needed
permission from the foreign exchange authorities to purchase real estate. 64 The
foreign exchange authorities refused permission more often than they granted it.
65
Today, foreign companies enjoy the same treatment as Hungarian enterprises,'
except these companies still must seek permission from the Hungarian Govern-
ment if they wish to acquire real estate. 67 The government conditions permission
to purchase real property on the business activities of a company. 6' To own real
59. See Participation Law, supra note 55. Poland's foreign investment law is the most liberal in
Eastern Europe. Cole, supra note 16, at 688. The new law removes nearly all impediments to foreign
investment. Id.
60. The former Czechoslovak government modified the constitution to provide for the protection
of private property rights. Coopers & Lybrand, Czechoslovakia, supra note 35, § 3.2. The state has
begun returning land seized during the 1950s to its former owners. Doing Business in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 4.2.2.
In Hungary, like the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the state has begun returning land nationalized
during the 1950s. Doing Business In Hungary, supra note 17, § 4.2.1. Hungary again recognizes
private land ownership. Id.
In Poland the Communist government never succeeded in nationalizing all of the land. Zbigniew
M. Slupinski, Foreign Investment and Ownership Problems in Poland § I, in JOINT VENTURES AND
PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A4-4331,
1991). Today, few restrictions on land transfer are still in place, and freedom of contract between
buyers and sellers is being reintroduced. Id.
61. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 4.2.2.
62. Id.
63. Id. Nevertheless, joint ventures with foreign participation can only purchase land necessary
to fulfill the venture's corporate needs. Sumarm, supra note 12, at 375. The law prohibits purchasing
land for investment. Id.
64. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 4.2.1.
65. Id.
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estate foreign investors must prove that property ownership is necessary for their
business. 69 The government prohibits the purchase of real estate for speculation.70
Until 1932 Poland severely restricted the rights of foreign investors to purchase
real estate. 7 1 Today, foreign investors may purchase land and property from all
types of owners.72 Although the Ministry of the Interior requires joint ventures
with less than 50 percent Polish ownership to obtain permission to purchase land,73
the Ministry only refuses permission in exceptional circumstances.74
In practice, the feasibility of purchasing land in Poland depends on its location.75
Purchasing land in Warsaw is difficult because two postwar decrees have re-
stricted the alienability of land within the city. 76 Outside the city, however, an
investor can fairly easily obtain a permit to purchase realty.77
The governments of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland have
all made provisions to accommodate foreigners who wish to purchase real estate.
In theory these provisions cleared the last political barriers that prevented western
investors from purchasing land in Eastern Europe. In practice, however, many
more obstacles exist. These practical challenges present problems that make
purchasing land in Eastern Europe difficult, if not impossible.
In exploring the problems that limit a foreigner's ability to purchase land in
Eastern Europe, this comment focuses on the relationship between mortgage
lenders and borrowers. Although this comment explores many of these problems
in the context of Poland, the same challenges apply equally in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary. 7' This comment uses the example of Poland because it
69. Coopers & Lybrand, Hungary, supra note 20, § 4.2. Section 19 of Act XXIV of 1988 on
Foreign Investment in Hungary outlines this provision. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 20, § 19;
Gluck, supra note 18, at 164.
70. Foreign Investment Act, supra note 20; Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 4.2.1.
71. Doing Business in Poland, supra note 24, § 4.3.2.
72. The Law on Acquisition of Property by Foreigners, 1991 Dz.U. No. 24, item 202 (amended),
translated in 1990 WL 336648 (Polska); Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 4.2. In the
case of real estate purchased from the state treasury, somewhat different rules apply. Banasinski,
supra note 30, at 773. State officials must first offer state-owned land to the original owners from
whom it was nationalized. Id. The land must be offered at fair market value. Id. If the original owner
does not wish to repurchase the land, officials then offer the land to all qualified purchasers. Id.
73. Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 4.2. Foreigners do not need permission to
enter into a lease agreement unless the law considers the lease perpetual (40-99 years). Id. Permission
is not necessary if a Polish partner contributes real property to a joint venture with less than 50%
Polish participation. Slupinski, supra note 60, § VI. Private partners may contribute full ownership
of title of real estate to ajoint venture. Id. § 11(b). Until recently state partners were unable to contribute
full ownership title to real property. Id. Now the law allows state partners to a joint venture, like
private partners, to contribute full title to real property. Id.




78. Several factors make Poland attractive to foreign investors: (1) More than 1.5 million private
concerns have been registered in Poland; (2) Poland now has a currency with a stable exchange rate;
(3) hyperinflation has been conquered; and (4) foreign investors committed almost a billion dollars of
investment capital to Poland last year alone. Jan Krzysztof Bieleck, Poland: No Retreat From Democ-
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is currently the most attractive Eastern European nation for foreign investment. 79
First, however, before discussing reasons why lenders are hesitant to finance
foreign real estate purchases, this comment reviews the mechanics of a traditional
U.S. real estate transaction.
H. Possible Problems with Eastern European Property as Collateral
A. THE MECHANICS OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
Generally, American investors borrow money to purchase real estate and pledge
the property as collateral for the loan.s° If the investor cannot repay the loan, the
lender forecloses the collateral and holds the borrower liable for any deficiency
between the unpaid loan balance and the amount received from the sale of the
foreclosed property."
This method of borrowing money is usually low risk because the transaction
is premised on the lender's interest in the property." If the borrower defaults on
an obligation, the lender can be made whole with proceeds from the sale of the
property." In the United States a lender generally is not concerned about the
security of realty pledged as collateral-the government will not foreclose the
lender's interest in the land." Moreover, the lender usually reasonably believes
in the viability of the borrower's financial well-being.85
Overseas, the situation is much different. The unstable political and economic
environment of many countries compromises the security of foreign collateral. s6
Lenders must account for direct political risks such as expropriation and political
violence;87 indirect political risks such as profit repatriation and income tax;88
environmental risks such as fires and natural disasters;8 9 and commercial risks
such as currency devaluation, cost overruns, and inferior quality.' Finally, and
racy, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1992, final ed., at A26. To show its commitment to capitalism, Poland
reopened its stock exchange on April 16, 1991. Mary Battiata, Poland's Stock Exchange Has Slow but
Happy Start; Trading Is First in More than 50 Years, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1991, final ed., at B1.
79. See Bieleck, supra note 78, at A26.
80. JESSE DuLKEMN IER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 588-91 (2d ed. 1988).
81. Id.; see, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 51.002,51.003 (Vernon 1992). In the United States
lenders foreclose mortgages at public auctions supervised by officers ofthe court. DUKEMINIER & KIER,
supra note 80, at 590. As an alternative lawyers developed the deed of trust to avoid the long and expen-
sive process ofjudicial foreclosure. Id. Under a deed of trust, the borrower conveys title to the property
to a trustee who has the right to sell the property if the borrower defaults. Id. at 591. Aside from the right
to private foreclosure, however, a deed of trust is essentially the same as a mortgage. Id.
82. DUKEMINIER & KIER, supra note 80, at 589.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of property without due process of law. Id.
85. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 80, at 588.
86. See supra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
SPRING 1994
92 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
perhaps most importantly, lenders must account for the legal risks associated with
foreign collateral. 9'
B. DIRECT POLITICAL RISKS
1. Problems
a. Expropriation
Because of direct political risks, lenders are hesitant to lend money to borrowers
who pledge foreign property as collateral.92 On a basic level, the market economies
of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary do not have a proven
record of success.93 If the standard of living in Eastern Europe continues to
erode, these governments could possibly nationalize industries they had once
privatized. 94 If this nationalization should happen, private owners of realty could
be forced to relinquish their property to the government without recourse. The
process of retaking privatized property is called expropriation. 9 Most industrial-
ized nations view expropriation as an illegal act unless it serves a public purpose
and prompt and adequate compensation follows. 96 Another concern for foreign
investors is de facto, or "creeping," nationalization.97 Political acts, such as
discriminatory taxation and regulation, can effectively nationalize a business by
making it impossible for the business to carry on profitably. 9 Expropriation
especially troubles lenders. Conceivably., mortgaged realty could be nationalized
and its owners-equitably the lenders-left without compensation." Domestic
lenders are unwilling to take this risk.' 0
b. Political Violence
Another direct political risk, political violence, is also common.' 0 ' Political
violence can have the twofold effect of expropriating property and closing other-
91. See infra notes 243-77 and accompanying text.
92. See McGown, supra note 7.
93. See generally EAST, supra note 12.
94. Kaiser, supra note 43, at DI. The average standard of living in former Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland fell in both 1990 and 1991. Id.
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (6th ed. 1990).
96. Robert B. Shanks, Investment Protection for Projects in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union:
OPIC, MIGA and Bilateral Investment Treaties, Types of Risk para. 4, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE
AND INVESTMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 1990 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. A4-43 11, 1990).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. If a government nationalizes an entire economy, the government will most likely compensate
all private owners.
100. See McGown, supra note 7.
101. Political violence includes war, revolution, insurrection, terrorism, and civil strife. Robert
B. Shanks, Protecting Against Political Risks, Including Currency Convertibility and Repatriation of
Profits in Eastern Europe § ll(B)(1)(c), in JOINT VENTURES AND PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
(PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A4-4331, 1991).
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wise profitable businesses. 02 Lenders should always consider the possibility of
political violence when evaluating the security of foreign collateral, especially in
Eastern Europe, where new political parties are trying to take root.
2. Solutions
a. Treaties
In response to these concerns nations frequently negotiate bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) with one another to eliminate international uncertainties. °3 For
example, to encourage American investment in Poland, the United States and
Poland agreed to a bilateral treaty on business and economic relations.l°4 The
U.S.-Poland BIT addresses several foreign investment issues, including the na-
tionalization of private property.'O
The U.S.-Poland BIT does not eliminate the Polish Government's ability to
102. Id.
103. Sometimes direct legislation, rather than treaties, protects foreign investors. For example,
in Hungary section 1 of Act XXIV of 1988 on Foreign Investment in Hungary indemnifies foreign
investors against losses suffered as a result of "nationalization, expropriation, or other measures
having equivalent effect on ownership rights." Foreign Investment Act, supra note 20, § 1; Gluck,
supra note 18, at 162.
104. Treaty ConcerningBusiness and Economic Relations, Mar.21, 1990, U.S.-Poland, 29 I.L.M.
1194 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Poland BIT]. This treaty is the first U.S. investment agreement with
any Eastern European country. Todd Ewing, Note, The Treaty with Poland Concerning Business and
Economic Relations: Does It Provide More Incentive to the American Investor, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 352, 355 (1990). The U.S.-Poland BIT provides incentives for U.S. investment beyond that
provided for in the 1990 Polish Foreign Investment Law. Id.; Participation Law, supra note 55.
Although agreed to, the U.S.-Poland BIT will not be officially in force until the two countries
exchange "instruments of ratification." East-West Trade: Polish Premier Announces New Initiative
to Bring U.S. Investment Treaty into Force, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 673 (Apr. 15, 1992). Experts
expected ratification to occur sometime during the summer of 1991, but as of September 1993 the
treaty had still not been ratified. 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1492 (Sep. 15, 1993). Separately, West
Germany has the benefit of a bilateral investment treaty with Poland. Spotlight on EE Developments,
May 21, 1990, available in Westlaw, BUS-INT'L database, Business Eastern Europe Journal. The
Polish-German treaty was officially ratified in mid-May 1990. Id.
The United States and Hungary have been negotiating a bilateral investment treaty similar to the
U.S.-Poland BIT. East-West Trade: U.S. -Hungary Investment Treaty Stalled on Intellectual Property,
National Treatment, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 771 (Apr. 29, 1992). A bilateral treaty protecting
investors against impairment of contractual rights and other interests already exists. Agreement on
Trade Relations, Mar. 17, 1978, U.S.-Hung., 29 U.S.T. 2711. Disagreement over intellectual prop-
erty protection has delayed progress on the treaty for nearly a year. Id. As of September 1993, the
treaty was still unsigned. 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1492 (Sep. 15, 1993).
Meanwhile, the United States and former Czechoslovakia agreed to a bilateral investment treaty.
East-West Trade: Privatization Offers U.S. Investors "Extraordinary" Chance, Havel Says, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1588 (Oct. 30, 1991). Representatives of the two countries signed the treaty on
October 22, 1991. Id.
As of May 1991, the United States had negotiated and ratified bilateral investment treaties with
several countries outside of Eastern Europe: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Grenada, Morocco, Panama,
Senegal, Turkey, and Zaire. Eleanor Roberts Lewis, The United States-Poland Treaty Concerning
Business and Economic Relations: New Themes and Variations in the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 527, 533 (1991).
105. U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, art. VII.
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nationalize private property owned by foreigners.'°6 Instead, it imposes four
criteria that the government must satisfy before it can nationalize private prop-
erty.'07 First, the Polish Government must offer a legitimate public purpose for
taking the property. 108 Second, the nationalization must not discriminate among
foreign and domestic owners.,0 9 Third, the government must fairly compensate
private owners for their nationalized property." 0 Finally, the government must
award compensation in a manner consistent with the principles of due process and
treatment as set forth in the treaty. 1
The expropriation provisions of the U.S.-Poland BIT protect both borrowers
and lenders. If the government expropriates a borrower's property, it will fairly
compensate the borrower. 2 This compensation, in turn, could be credited directly
to the outstanding balance of the borrower's loan.
b. International Arbitration
Article 11(7) of the U.S. -Poland BIT allows the parties to decide the terms for
enforcement of the treaty's provisions. 3 The treaty suggests the parties choose
international arbitration for enforcement. "14 Mortgage lenders find this suggestion
particularly attractive because the availability of international arbitration could
106. Nancy J. Goodman, International Trade: Poland Bilateral Investment Treaty-A Reflection
of United States Efforts to Shape the Economic Development of Eastern Europe, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
255 (1991). Additionally, the Polish Constitution protects investors against expropriation without
public purpose or just compensation. POL. CONST. art. 7, amended by Law No. 75, para. 444 (1989).
Disgruntled investors can turn to U.S. statutory provisions if a foreign government unreasonably
expropriates their property. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 permits U.S. trade representatives
to take retaliatory action if a foreign government unreasonably expropriates property belonging to
a U.S. citizen. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1988).
107. Id.
108. U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, art. VII.
109. Id.
110. Id. This provision leaves investors with unanswered questions. For example, the U.S.-Poland
BIT uses the term "fair market value" as a measure of compensation for nationalized property. Id.
As a practical matter the term "fair market value" would lose its meaning in the context of widespread
nationalization because the concept of a market would be absent. Moreover, the U.S.-Poland BIT
does not establish a method for determining fair market value. See id. Investors can only assume
that the agency of nationalization establishes such a method. Offering investors the alternative of
compensation based on historical value, if the fair market value of the property is less than historical
value, would enhance the fairness of the treaty. With the addition of historical value investors would
know with certainty the minimum amount of compensation they would receive in the event of expropri-
ation.
IIt. Id. Article II(6) of the U.S.-Poland BIT provides that:
Investments] shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security
and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law. Neither Party shall in any
way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
acquisition, expansion or disposal of investments. Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into
with regard to investments.
112. Id. art. VII.
113. Id. Article 11(7) of the U.S.-Poland BIT provides: "Each party shall provide effective means
of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investments under this Treaty and authorizations
relating thereto, with the exception of denials thereof, and investment agreements."
114. Goodman, supra note 106, at 262.
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enhance the value of their international loan portfolios. 1 5 Borrowers find interna-
tional arbitration equally attractive because it increases the security of their foreign
property interests.
116
To settle disputes between a host state and a foreign investor, a United Nation's
convention created the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID).I"7 United Nations delegates called for the convention to encourage
or, more appropriately, not discourage foreign investment in developing coun-
tries." Under the provisions of the ICSID Convention a country and a foreign
investor can agree to submit their investment disputes to an ICSID tribunal rather
than their national courts."19
The ICSID grants parties substantial freedom to tailor arbitration to their needs;
however, some restrictions do apply. 120 For example, the jurisdiction of the ICSID
is limited to a state, its agencies, and a national of another contracting state. 2'
Also, annulments of decisions made by the ICSID tribunal must be based on
defined grounds.' 22
A complete arbitration clause contains: (1) an agreement to submit all dis-
putes arising under the contract to arbitration; (2) an agreed place of arbitra-
tion; and (3) a direction on the appointment of arbitrators.' 23 Under the ICSID
115. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Emmanuel Gaillard, Some Notes on the
Drafting of ICSID Arbitration Clauses, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A4-4236/2, 1988); W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 46-47 (1992).
118. W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989
DuiE L.J. 739, 750.
119. Id. Article IX(3)(a) of the U.S.-Poland BIT provides: "At any time after six months from
the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in
writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by conciliation or binding arbitration to the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes."
As of November 1993, Poland was not a signatory to the ICSID Convention, although it intends
to sign the Convention in the near future. See Marian Nash Leich, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 895, 900 (1990).
As a background to this provision Poland wanted foreign investors to exhaust all remedies through
local courts before proceeding to international arbitration. Lewis, supra note 104, at 541. The United
States, on the other hand, wanted investors to have the option to initiate international arbitration at
any time after six months from the date on which the dispute arose. Id. As a compromise the two
countries decided on the purely advisory language that encourages the settlement of investment
disputes in local courts, but does not take away from the investor's right to initiate international
arbitration after six months. Id.; U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, art. IX(2).
120. Gaillard, supra note 117, para. 3.
121. Id. The ICSID Convention provides: "The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities
for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of
other Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention." ICSID Convention,
supra note 117, art. 1.
122. Id. art. 52.
123, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487
reporter's notes (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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Convention the parties can agree on the choice of law provisions the tribunal
will apply. 124 The parties may also adopt clauses concerning the enforcement
of awards. '25
Countries that follow the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards 126 will give deference to the awards of foreign
arbitration proceedings.127 In the United States both federal and state courts
have jurisdiction to enforce arbitral agreements under the Arbitral Awards
Convention, despite citizenship or amount in controversy. 128 The parties may
remove actions brought to enforce arbitral awards to federal court any time
before trial. 29
International awards not falling under the Arbitral Awards Convention may be
enforced in state or federal court. 130 However, most state arbitration statutes do
not provide for the enforcement of international arbitral awards.13' Therefore,
the claimant must seek enforcement in federal court on diversity of citizenship
grounds.12 Typically, U.S. courts enforce foreign arbitration awards.'33
The ICSID provides valuable insurance for foreign investors.'3 It is especially
useful in the case of expropriation where treaties, such as the U.S. -Poland BIT,
do not ensure that the government will appropriately compensate investors for the
current value of their assets.135 Because a treaty cannot provide for all possible
contingencies,136 the ICSID promotes certainty by providing investors with a fair
and inexpensive way to resolve disputes over international contracts. 137
The availability of the ICSID enhances the attractiveness of foreign collateral.
Under ICSID arbitration foreign purchasers of land know they will be fairly
compensated in the event of expropriation. The availability of the ICSID in
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should change lenders' atti-
tudes toward real property pledged as collateral. The ICSID can protect both
lenders and borrowers against loss.
124. Id.; ICSID Convention, supra note 117, art. 42.
125. ICSID Convention, supra note 117, art. 54(1).
126. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force 1959; entered into force
for the United States 1970) [hereinafter Arbitral Awards Convention].
127. Id. art. IMI; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 123, § 487(1).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 123, § 487 cmt. a.
129. 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West 1992).
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 123, § 487 cmt. a.
131. Id. reporter's note 8.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally Gaillard, supra note 117, comments.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Arbitration-Annulment ofArbitral Award for Failure to Apply Law
Applicable Under ICSID Convention and Failure to State Sufficiently Pertinent Reasons, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 222 (1987).
137. The ICSID Convention allows for the predetermination of arbitrators' fees by express provi-
sion in the contract. ICSID Convention, supra note 117, art. 61(2).
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In theory the ICSID provides an attractive alternative for investors concerned
about receiving fair treatment in foreign courts. Economically, however, the
ICSID is not as attractive. 38 The problem centers on ICSID Convention article
52, which provides for the review and possible annulment of arbitral awards. 39
Experts have interpreted article 52 to authorize re-arbitration of a tribunal's award
in almost all cases.'4 Losers are foolish not to appeal adverse awards 4' because
past review boards have given little deference to tribunal decisions. 42 As a result,
critics consider the ICSID Convention, in its current form, to be an uneconomical
system for dispute resolution. 143
c. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Insurance
Although a reliable dispute resolution system is available, nothing guarantees
that foreign investors will receive full satisfaction of their claims. To fully protect
their investments against loss resulting from adverse political activity, investors
must obtain international insurance. The United States Government and the World
Bank have each established international insurance organizations. '"These organi-
zations were created to insure foreign investors against political risks such as
expropriation, currency inconvertibility, and war or political uprising.'4 Com-
mercial risks such as currency devaluation and default are not insurable under the
charters of these organizations, but may be insured privately. '
The United States Government established the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) to encourage private investment in developing countries.' 4
OPIC insures U.S. investors against political risks in foreign countries. 148 To be
eligible for insurance, a prospective investor must meet specific criteria.' 49 First,
the investor must be a U.S. citizen, natural or corporate.'o Second, the investor's
138. REISMAN, supra note 117, at 50.
139. Id.
140. See generally id. at 51-65.
141. Id. at 87.
142. See generally id.
143. Id.
144. Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(l)-(2); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The
Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA) and the Settlement of Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4236/2, 1988).
145. Shihata, supra note 144, para. 4.
146. Id.
147. Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(1).
148. Id. The U.S. Code codifies the congressional statement of purpose, creation, and function
of OPIC. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191 (West 1993). The statute refersto thepurposeof OPIC as: "To mobilize
and facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social
development of less developed countries and areas .... thereby complementing the development
assistance objectives of the United States." Id.
149. Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(1).
150. Shanks, supra note 101, § Ill(D)(1)(b). Entities incorporated outside the United States are
eligible for coverage if U.S. persons or nationals own more than 95%. Id.
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project must be located in a "developing friendly country." 1' Third, the investor
must rely on the availability of OPIC insurance in making a decision whether to
undertake the project.'52 Fourth, the project must be classified as a new invest-
ment. 153 Fifth, a "satisfactory agreement" between OPIC and the host govern-
ment must be in place.54 Finally, the investor's project must not result in a net
loss of U.S. jobs or offset the U.S. balance of payments. 55
For eligible projects OPIC offers insurance for up to 90 percent of the project's
value, provided it is not more than $100 million. 156 The duration of OPIC coverage
is long term, up to twenty years, and the full faith and credit of the United States
Government support it. "' Like most international insurance organizations, OPIC
covers all types of political risks, but excludes commercial risks.'58
OPIC insurance specifically covers the following political risks: expropriation,
currency inconvertibility, and political violence.'5 9 Expropriation encompasses
all acts of expropriation, including acts by the host government that are outside its
role as a regulatory authority and commercial participant. 160 OPIC distinguishes
currency inconvertibility from currency devaluation. The OPIC charter allows
insured investors to enter currency inconvertibility claims if they cannot convert
profits to U.S. dollars, ' 6' but excludes claims for losses due to unfavorable conver-
sion rates. " Finally, OPIC insurance protects investors against losses from politi-
cal violence. 163 In general, political violence includes acts undertaken with the
151. Id. OPIC loosely defines a "developing friendly country" as a non-Communist country
(subject to exceptions) having an average per capita income of less than $3,887 (real 1982 U.S.
dollars). Id. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland are all currently eligible for OPIC
programs. East-West Trade: Poland Needs Foreign Capital to Meet Privatization Goals, Ambassador
Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 830 (May 29, 1991). Currently, OPIC operates in more than 100
countries worldwide. Shanks, supra note 101, § Il(D)(1)(b).
152. Shanks, supra note 101, § III(D)(1)(b). The organization intends this criteria to disqualify
any investment that could go forward without the assistance of OPIC insurance. Id.
153. Id. "New," for purposes of the statute, includes modernization and expansion of existing
facilities. Id.
154. Id. This agreement provides several things. Most importantly, it (1) provides OPIC with
rights of subrogation for claims paid on behalf of its insured; and (2) requires that disputes be resolved
through international arbitration in accordance with the international rules. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. § Ill(D)(1)(a). Case-by-case exceptions can be made to extend coverage beyond the $100
million limit. Id. OPIC may insure up to 100% of loans by lending institutions. Id. § III(D)(1)(b).
157. Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(1). While private risk insurance is
available, its term of coverage is considerably shorter-one to three years-with rollover at the option
of the insurer. Id. § B(3).
158. Id. § B(I). The distinction between political and commercial risks is often blurry. Forinstance,
while the setting of currency exchange rates has a clear political element, OPIC treats currency
devaluation as a commercial risk and will not insure against it. Shanks, supra note 101, § lI(D)(l)(a).
159. Id.
160. Id. § Ill(D)(1)(c).
161. Shanks, supra note 101, § III(D)(l)(c). OPIC defines currency inconvertibility as the inability
to readily convert foreign earnings or returns to U.S. dollars within a ninety-day period. Shanks,
supra note 96, Types of Risk para. 3.
162. Shanks, supra note 96, Types of Risk para. 3.
163. Id. para. 5.
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primary intent of achieving a political objective.64 These acts include war, revolu-
tion, civil strife, terrorism, and sabotage.
1 65
OPIC insurance, like international arbitration, limits the risk of investing in a
foreign country. By founding OPIC, the United States Government hoped to
encourage investors to pursue foreign projects they would otherwise forgo because
of unfavorable risk-reward ratios.'66 For lenders who accept foreign realty as
collateral, the availability of OPIC insurance provides added security.1 67 If a
foreign government expropriates insured collateral, the borrower can recover
from OPIC and repay the lender.
68
Although OPIC insurance has made several investments possible,'T69 it still has
major drawbacks, the foremost being the exclusion of commercial risks from
coverage. 7° In the unstable economies of Eastern Europe, commercial risks are
as much a concern as political risks. '7 Commercial risks such as currency devalua-
tion, cost overruns, unmarketable products, and inferior quality concern invest-
ors.' 72 Lenders are particularly vulnerable. The potential for borrowers to default
on loans abroad, given the commercial uncertainties of starting a business over-
seas, is far greater than the potential for borrowers to default on domestic loans.,7
d. Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency Insurance
The success of OPIC laid the groundwork for the Multilateral Investment
Guaranty Agency (MIGA). The World Bank established MIGA on April 12,
1988.174 Like other World Bank organizations, the Bank's governing board cre-
ated MIGA to "facilitate and encourage the flow of resources for productive
purposes to member countries, particularly developing member countries." 75 In
keeping with this objective, MIGA's purpose is twofold: (1) to provide consulta-
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. Managing Political Risks § B(1).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. OPIC insured the largest western investment in Eastern Europe to date: General Electric's
purchase of a majority interest in Tungsram Company, Ltd., a Hungarian manufacturer of lighting
products, for $150 million. Shanks, supra note 101, § IV(A)(1). OPIC supported Citicorp's entry
into Hungary. Id. § IV(A)(2). Citicorp was one of the first foreign banks to open in Hungary. Id.
OPIC insured US WEST, a Colorado-based telephone company, in developing a cellular phone
network in Hungary. Id. § IV(A)(3). OPIC also supported the construction of the Warsaw Marriott
in Poland and insured the Copernican Group's investment in a Polish company that processes potatoes
and grain. Id. §§ IV(A)(5), IV(A)(6).
170. See Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(1).
171. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
172. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
173. See generally infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
174. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 24 I.L.M. 1598
(1985) [hereinafter MIGA Convention]; Shihata, supra note 144, para. 1. The Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency Convention established MIGA. Id. It became the newest addition to the World
Bank's systems of organizations, one of which is the ICSID. Id.
175. Shihata, supra note 144, para. 3.
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tion on the improvement of investment conditions for member countries, and (2)
to insure foreign investments against noncommercial risks. 176 The types of risk
insurable by MIGA resemble the types of risk insurable by OPIC.
MIGA insures investors against political risk. 17 Like OPIC, MIGA policies
protect investors against expropriation, currency inconvertibility, political vio-
lence, and breach of contract risks. 178 To be eligible for coverage against these
risks, applicants must meet several criteria.
First, applicants must be engaged in the export or export financing of U.S.
goods. 179 Second, applicants must be nationals of a MIGA member country
other than the host country. 8 0 Third, applicants must request insurance for an
investment.' 8' Fourth, investments must represent new development. '82 Fifth,
prospective investments must be approved by the host country. 183 Finally,
investments must involve the transfer of resources from abroad into the host
country. 1
As compared to OPIC, MIGA's coverage is limited.' 85 The Bank restricts
MIGA's coverage to fifteen years in duration and $50 million for each proj-
ect. 186 The Bank designed MIGA to operate on a self-sustaining basis, paying
claims and meeting operating expenses out of operating income. 87 As a new
agency MIGA has not yet established a record of reliability. 188 For this reason,
investors sometimes use MIGA as a backup to OPIC insurance. 89 Since MIGA
is a World Bank organization, it commands the respect of the international
community and, as a multilateral institution, avoids the constraints of domestic
concerns. 190
176. Id. para. 4.
177. Id.
178. Shanks, supra note 101, § l11(D)(2)(a). In contrast to OPIC expropriation coverage, MIGA's
expropriation coverage protects investors against partial expropriation. Id. For example, MIGA would
cover a foreign investor squeezed out of a foreign business that was majority owned by a foreign
government. See id. In this instance MIGA would compensate the investor for the loss in value of
the investor's interest, whereas OPIC would only compensate the investor for a totally diluted interest.
See id. Aside from this difference, MIGA's coverage against political risk is the same as OPIC's.
Id.
179. Id. § I/(D)(2)(a).
180. Id.
181. Id. The MIGA Convention purposefully avoids defining "investment" in order to make
MIGA insurance available to emerging forms of industrial cooperation. See MIGA Convention, supra
note 174, at 1600.
182. Shanks, supra note 101, § III(D)(2)(a).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(2).
186. Id.
187. MIGA Convention, supra note 174, at 1601.
188. See Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks § B(2).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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e. Title Insurance
The best, but probably least realistic, way to insure foreign collateral against
loss is through a title insurance policy.' 9' If political acts cloud title, the mortgagee,
who is the beneficiary of the policy, could recover and, in turn, subrogate any
claims against the government to the insurer.
The domestic title insurance industry arose out of the need of mortgage lenders
to protect themselves against the risks of doing business with borrowers in other
states.'9 This same need for protection applies in the international forum.
193
Unfortunately, investors will find international title insurance difficult to obtain,
especially in Eastern Europe where uncertainty regarding property ownership
makes title virtually uninsurable.'94
3. Conclusion
Investors can currently obtain international insurance throughout Eastern Eu-
rope. Investors in the former Communist bloc now have two insurance organiza-
tions to protect them against political risk-OPIC and MIGA. The availability of
international arbitration and title insurance adds a second degree of protection.
Investors may now undertake projects that otherwise would not be feasible because
of political risks.
For lenders these protective mechanisms make foreign collateral more attrac-
tive. First, political risk insurance functions much the way that casualty insurance
functions for domestic collateral-a lender could require a borrower to obtain
political risk insurance before the lender will accept foreign realty as collateral.
Second, a lender could require a borrower and the state to agree that any dispute
arising from the purchase of land be resolved through international arbitration.
The availability of a neutral form of dispute resolution will strengthen the lender's
confidence in the quality of the purchaser's ownership interest. Finally, a lender
could reduce its exposure to risk by requiring a borrower to obtain international
title insurance where available.
C. INDIRECT POLITICAL RISKS
Direct political risks aside, landowners still face political risks that indirectly
affect the security of foreign collateral. To reduce these risks international invest-
ment treaties typically provide remedies for indirect political contingencies. Two
issues usually addressed are profit repatriation and income taxes.




194. See supra note 60; see also Michael L. Neff, Comment, Eastern Europe's Policy on Restitution
of Property in the 1990s, 10 DicK. J. INT'L L. 357, 358 (1992). The Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Poland all have considered returning real property to owners whose land was expropri-
ated during Communist rule. Id.
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1. Repatriation of Profits
a. Problem
Transferring surplus profits from a host country is one of the challenges of
doing business overseas. Foreign laws often restrict the percentage of business
profits that can be transferred out of a country.'s For example, Polish law limits
the amount of profits a foreign-owned business may repatriate in any given year
to its trade surplus for that year.' 9
Restrictions on profit repatriation pose problems for foreign investors. Even
though investors realize profits overseas, they may not be able to convert the
profits into domestic currency. This fact concerns lenders. Usually, borrowers
intend to pay off their mortgages with profits generated by the realty or a business
located on the realty. 97 If income earned from the property cannot be fully
repatriated, borrowers may be unable to meet their mortgage obligations, even
though their overseas investments are thriving.
b. Solution
i. Treaties. Developing countries recognize that limiting profit repatriation
discourages foreign investment. As a result, investment treaties frequently relax
restrictions on profit repatriation. The U.S.-Poland BIT, for example, requires
progressively favorable repatriation treatment for U.S. investors as compared
with existing law.' 9 The U.S.-Poland BIT calls for a gradual increase in the
percentage of profits eligible for repatriation through 1994. '9 After 1995 all
profits will be eligible for repatriation. 200
The U.S. -Poland BIT provision concerning profit repatriation mitigates a sub-
195. Leich, supra note 119, at 899.
196. Id. In Poland a foreign company may only repatriate 15 % of profits earned in excess of its
export surplus. Id. Repatriation of profits is not a problem for foreign investors doing business in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Cole, supra note 16, at 673. The Czechoslovak Foreign Exchange Act
provides for the free repatriation of all profits. Id.
197. See generally Caryl B. Welborn, An Analysis of Commercial Space Leases from the Perspec-
tive of a Secured Lender, in COMMaERCIAL REAL ESTATE LEASES 1990 (PLI Real Est. L. & Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. N4-4533, 1990). Especially in the case of nonrecourse mortgages,
lenders should review the borrowers' expected cash flow from the property. Id.
198. Leich, supra note 119, at 899.
199. Id. The profits repatriation scale, as established by the treaty, is as follows:
as of January 1, 1992-20% of profits gained in 1990-91;
as of January 1, 1993-35% of profits gained in 1990-92;
as of January 1, 1994-50% of profits gained in 1990-93;
as of January 1, 1995-80% of profits gained in 1990-94;
as of January 1, 1996-100% of profits gained in 1990-95.
"If the Republic of Poland introduces full convertibility of its currency before 1st January, 1996,
transfers of profits shall be made without restrictions from the date of introduction to full convertibil-
ity." U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, Protocol para. 4. The treaty provides further that: "The
Republic of Poland shall ensure that the opportunity exists to invest profits which cannot be transferred
in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Protocol in a bank account that yields a positive real rate of
interest." Id. Protocol para. 5.
200. U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, Protocol para. 5.
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stantial risk of doing business in a foreign nation.20 Lenders can structure mort-
gage repayment schedules according to the treaty's profit repatriation provisions.
If the Polish Government refuses to honor the repatriation provisions of the treaty,
the borrower will have a cause of action against the government. 22 International
arbitration could resolve this dispute.2 °3
ii. Insurance. As secondary protection against currency inconvertibility,
investors could obtain insurance. OPIC and MIGA both cover currency inconvert-
ibility.2° 0 OPIC defines currency inconvertibility as the inability of an investor
"to convert earnings from or returns of the foreign investment into U.S. dollars
for a period of 90 days." 20 5 OPIC insurance, however, does not cover currency




Each country, as a sovereign, has the freedom to impose taxes on those who
do business or own property within its jurisdictional boundaries.2 °7 In Eastern
Europe each country has its own system of tax assessment and collection. 08 While
the tax systems of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland have many
similarities, they also have marked differences.
Shortly before its demise, the former Czechoslovakia unveiled a wide-ranging
tax reform package modeled after European Community practice. 2°9 When the
Czech Republic and Slovakia declared their independence from former Czecho-
slovakia, each adopted its own system of taxation. 210 Aside from subtle differ-
ences, the tax codes of these two countries closely resemble each other and reflect
former Czechoslovakia's move toward a western system of taxation.211
201. Although the parties did not negotiate the U.S.-Poland BIT for the exclusive purpose of
protecting foreign investments in Poland, it certainly accomplishes this objective. See Ewing, supra
note 104, at 360. Indeed, the Letter of Submittal to the U.S.-Poland BIT states:
In addition, the treaty will encourage, facilitate and protect U.S. investment and business activity in Poland, which
can act as an important stimulus to economic reform. Potential U.S. investors who otherwise might perceive
uncertainties in the current business climate in Poland will find considerable assurance in the protections provided
by this treaty.
U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, Letter of Submittal para. 2.
202. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
203. See Gaillard, supra note 117, comments. Failure to honor a treaty provision is the kind of
dispute international arbitration was designed to resolve. See id. This situation demonstrates the
effectiveness of strengthening political certainty through bilateral investment treaties. See id.
204. Shanks, supra note 96, Managing Political Risks §§ B(1), B(2).
205. Id. Types of Risk para. 3.
206. Id. Managing Political Risks § B(1).
207. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Congress vested with the power to lay and collect taxes).
208. Richard M. Hammer, Tax Structure in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, in JOINT
VENTURE AND PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4331, 1991).
209. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 7.1.1.
210. Id.
211. Id. §§ 7.1.2-7.10. Both tax systems include corporate tax, value-added tax, personal income
tax, consumption tax, real estate taxes, road tax, estate and gift tax, and local taxes. Id.
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In 1988 and 1991 the Hungarian Parliament changed the country's tax system
to more closely resemble Western tax structures. 1 2 Currently, Hungary assesses
four types of taxes: corporation taxes, value-added tax, personal income tax, and
withholding tax. 213 All Hungarian business entities, whether corporate, partner-
ship, or state, are taxed on the same basis.214
The Hungarian Government assesses corporate tax against all business profits,
despite foreign participation. 215 Like most western systems of taxation, profits
may not be reduced by the payment of dividends or interest, but losses may be
carried forward.216 To encourage foreign investment, profits earned by Hungarian
joint ventures enjoy favorable tax treatment. 7
The Polish tax system resembles the tax systems of the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, and Hungary. The principal taxes in Poland are corporation tax, withhold-
ing tax, value-added tax, real estate tax, and income tax.2 s Poland is currently
considering changing its tax system to align it more closely with the tax systems
of other European countries.219
Under the current Polish tax structure the government taxes corporate profits
at a 40 percent rate. 220 The government also taxes joint ventures with foreign
participation at a 40 percent rate after a three-year tax holiday. 22' Like its Eastern
European neighbors, Poland has negotiated tax treaties with other countries.222
212, Coopers & Lybrand, Hungary, supra note 20, § 5.1.
213. Hammer, supra note 208, Hungary § I(i). Excluded from the list are real property taxes. Id.
With the introduction of private land ownership, real property taxes are sure to follow. The government
needs these taxes in order to further align the Hungarian taxation system with western systems of
taxation. See generally Gluck, supra note 18, at 163-64.
214. Coopers & Lybrand, Hungary, supra note 20, § 5.1.
215. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 7.2.2. The corporate tax system is progressive:
35% on the first three million forints and 40% on the profits thereafter. Hammer, supra note 208,
Hungary § 11(i).
216. Id.
217. Id. Hungary § VII(ii). Joint ventures with at least 25% foreign participation receive a 20%
tax rate reduction. Id. This reduction only applies to joint ventures operating before January 1, 1991.
Id.
218. Hammer, supra note 208, Poland § I(i). Poland's tax system provides for the taxation of
privately owned real estate. Id. Treating real estate as a taxable entity is consistent with Polish laws
on property ownership, which have always recognized the private ownership of land. See generally
Slupinski, supra note 60, § I.
219. Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 5.1.
220. Hammer, supra note 208, Poland § 11(i). The 40% tax rate is a flat rate applied equally to
all corporations conducting business in Poland. Coopers & Lybrand, Poland, supra note 25, § 5.2.
However, certain corporate investments receive significant tax incentives. Investment expenditures
in connection with environmental protection are 100% deductible in the year of purchase. Hammer,
supra note 208, Poland § Il(ii)(c)(i). Investment expenditures in connection with agriculture are 50%
deductible in the year of purchase. Id.
221. Hammer, supra note 208, Poland § IV(ii). Under certain circumstances, the three-year tax
holiday may be extended, or the joint venture may be exempted from taxes altogether. Id. Poland
§ IV(iii).
222. Id. Poland § VI.
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These treaties modify the applicability of the general tax code to foreign corpora-
tions doing business in Poland.223
Eastern European tax systems are problematic because they are continually
changing. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland recently have all
modified their tax structures. Continually changing tax systems create an uncer-
tain environment for foreign investment. The profitability of many investments
turns on their tax implications. 2 Unfavorable tax structures may cause investors
to abandon foreign projects instead of continuing to fortify them.225 De facto
expropriation from discriminatory tax systems also concerns foreign investors. 226
b. Solution
Investment treaties often include provisions to mitigate the risks to foreign
investors caused by changing tax rates and de facto expropriation. For example,
the U.S. -Poland BIT generally addresses the issue of taxation2 27 by requiring both
parties to apply tax policies fairly and equitably. 228 A bilateral tax treaty between
the United States and Poland addresses more specific tax concerns. 229
Undoubtedly, questions will arise regarding the interpretation of tax treaty
provisions. For this reason, international tax agreements, like BITs, should in-
clude provisions for international arbitration. 230 A neutral forum for dispute reso-
lution will protect investors against losses from changing tax structures and de
facto expropriation.
D. ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
Often, lenders require borrowers to insure property pledged as collateral
against damage caused by natural disasters.231 If a natural disaster destroys a
substantial portion of the pledged property, insurance policies protect the
223. Id.
224. Cf Sills, supra note 2, at 50, 54.
225. See generally id. Many U.S. real estate projects became economically unfeasible after the
1986 tax reform. Id.
226. Shanks, supra note 96, Types of Risk para. 5. Taxation is within the sovereign police
power of a nation. Id. Discriminatory changes in a host country's tax law could possibly result in a
"substantial loss of control over an investment or its putative benefits." Id.
227. Leich, supra note 119, at 900. The U.S.-Poland BIT does not specifically address tax issues
because the United States traditionally handles tax matters in separate tax treaties. Id.
228. Id. The U.S.-Poland BIT provides: "With respect to its tax policies, each party should strive
to accord fairness and equity in the treatment of, investment of, and commercial activity conducted
by, nationals and companies of the other party." U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, art. VI(I).
229. Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasions with
Respect to Taxes on Income, with Related Notes, Oct. 9, 1974, U.S.-Pot., art. 20, 28 U.S.T. 891,
919.
230. See, e.g., U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104, art. IX(2).
231. See Wade v. Seeburg, 688 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ) (a deed of
trust expressly provided that the borrower would insure the mortgaged property against loss by fire).
Natural disasters other than fire that could substantially destroy property and improvements include
floods, tornados, hurricanes, and hail.
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lender by providing the borrower with the funds necessary to restore the collat-
eral to its prior state.232
Internationally, lenders can demand the same type of protection. Fortunately,
several sources throughout Eastern Europe provide casualty insurance. Shortly
before the succession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the former Czechoslo-
vak government introduced new insurance legislation.233 Czech, Slovak, and
foreign companies now offer several types of policies. 23 In Hungary six insurance
carriers currently write policies. 235 Finally, in Poland insiders speculate that the




The developing market economies of Eastern Europe pose more than political
risks. Besides political risks, lenders must also account for commercial risks, which
generally are greater in the markets of developing countries .237 These risks include
cost overruns during construction, quality control, undercapitalization, and cur-
rency devaluation.238 Measuring these risks is difficult, but important. If commer-
cial risks are uncontrollable, an investor will have difficulty financing a project.239
2. Solution
In general, commercial risks are uninsurable. 2" Treaties do not provide protec-
tion against commercial risks.24 ' Investors usually allocate risks of this nature by
contract.2 4 2 To protect themselves against commercial risks lenders can require
borrowers to maintain defined levels of capitalization, file quarterly profit reports,
and annually appraise the value of realty that serves as collateral. All these
procedures would help mitigate a lender's exposure to commercial risks.
232. See generally id.
233. Doing Business in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, supra note 11, § 5.3.5.
234. Id.
235. Doing Business in Hungary, supra note 17, § 5.5.
236. Doing Business in Poland, supra note 24, § 5.5. Meanwhile, the state controls the insurance
market. Id.
237. Shanks, supra note 101, § U(A).
238. Id. The Member States of the European Community could significantly reduce the risk of
currency devaluation if they decide to adopt a common currency. See generally Maxwell J. Fry,
Monetary Policy Implementation During Europe's Transition to a Single Economy, in EUROPEAN
BANKING 43-64 (Andy Mullineux ed., 1992). A common currency would be supported by the econo-
mies of several nations and therefore mitigate the volatility of currency traded in newly formed market
economies. See generally id.
239. McGown, supra note 7.
240. Shanks, supra note 101, § II(A). OPIC and MIGA will not insure against any commercial
risk. Id.
241. See generally U.S.-Poland BIT, supra note 104.
242. Shanks, supra note 101, § II(A).
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Nonetheless, investors cannot provide for every commercial contingency. If
an uninsured commercial risk forces a lender to foreclose on a borrower's prop-
erty, new challenges await.
F. LEGAL CHALLENGES
1. Problem
As a general rule, the law of the state where real estate is situated resolves all
questions concerning the real estate and the interpretation and effect of instruments
relating to the land and interests in the land.243 This rule normally poses no
problems because the lender and the property are usually domiciled in the same
state. 2"
Similarly, the laws of the state govern mortgages on land situated in that state
since mortgages represent an interest in land.27 The local law of situs also governs
foreclosures because foreclosures represent interests in land.2" On the other hand
the laws of the jurisdiction where the parties write the mortgage decide issues that
do not affect an interest in the land,247 such as deficiency judgments. 248
These rules serve as a general background for foreign investors who want to
purchase land in Eastern Europe. In many Eastern European countries long-term
interest rates are high.49 The long-term interest rate in Poland, for example, is
near 60 percent. 250 As a result, foreign investors will likely look to domestic
creditors to finance their purchases.731 If an investor can find a domestic lender
who will offer credit, foreign law will govern the foreign property pledged as
collateral, despite provisions in the loan agreement to the contrary.252 For this
reason, lenders should familiarize themselves with the property laws of the juris-
diction where the pledged realty is located.
243. Howell v. Kline, 41 A.2d 580, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945) (the laws of the state of the situs
of the mortgaged property govern the mortgage).
244. This is true, in part, because federal law did not allow banks to establish offices out of state
until 1982. Margaret B. Crockett, Case Note, The Constitutionality of Regional Banking Laws:
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 27 B.C. L. REv. 821
(1986).
245. Howell v. Kline, 41 A.2d at 581.
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 229 (1987).
247. Id. § 229 cmt. e; see also State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Pyare Square Corp., 331 N.W.2d 656
(Wis. 1983) (court applied Wisconsin law to determine whether mortgagor had right to reinstate
mortgage of Minnesota property).
248. A deficiency judgment allows the lender to seek recovery from the borrower's personal
property if proceeds from the sale of the foreclosed mortgaged property do not satisfy the debt.
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 80, at 590. Texas, for example, preserves a lender's right to
recovery by deficiency judgment in its civil statutes. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (West 1993).
249. Doing Business in Poland, supra note 24, § 5.3.2.
250. Id. § 5.3.3.
251. According to joint venture law, a foreign company may freely borrow abroad without a
permit. Slupinski, supra note 60, § VII(B).
252. Howell v. Kline, 41 A.2d 580, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).
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2. Example-Polish Property Law
If the investor pledges Polish property as collateral, the property laws of Poland
will govern the land.253 Fortunately, Polish property law incorporates many West-
ern common law principles of property ownership. 254 Like its neighbors to the
west, Poland bases its laws of property ownership on a system of record title.
255
Polish law divides the Polish real estate register into four categories: location
and use, property rights, limited property rights and easements, and mortgages.256
The offices of the state notary keep these records on file.25 7 The public may
examine the register to determine the status of a piece of real property.258
Polish property law recognizes security interests in real estate. 259 Although
rarely used initially they now are beginning to play a larger role in Polish property
law as the market economy expands.2W
Mortgages of Polish real estate attach to the real estate as real property rights. 26'
These rights follow the debt, even if the creditor assigns the debt, until the
borrower fully satisfies the creditor.262 Upon mortgage default the mortgagee may
seek satisfaction from the mortgagor through an execution procedure. 263 To obtain
relief through an execution procedure the mortgagee must petition the court for
an "execution clause.', 26 When appropriate, the court clerk will foreclose on the
mortgage and force the sale of the property though a public auction to satisfy the
mortgagee.265
Whether Polish property law recognizes deficiency judgments remains un-
clear.2  Since deficiency claims go toward the full satisfaction of the mortgagee,
it seems unlikely that a Polish court would uphold an action in foreclosure to




254. See generally, Slupinski, supra note 60.







262. Id. § VII(B).
263. Id. An execution procedure directs an official to sell the property of a debtor in order to satisfy
a judgment. Foust v. Foust, 302 P.2d 11, 13 (Cal. 1956).
264. Slupinski, supra note 60, § VII(B).
265. According to Polish law a permit from the Ministry of Internal Affairs is required for foreign
persons (without Polish interests) to acquire real property in Poland-no matter by way of purchase
or by execution upon a mortgage. Id. § VII(B). Without such permission a foreign creditor may not
acquire ownership of foreclosed real estate. Id.
266. See generally id. § VII(A).
267. See generally id.
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3. Solution
The situs rule challenges a lender's ability to accept foreign realty as collat-
eral.268 Fortunately, investors can control risks associated with the situs rule. In
countries like Poland where the Ministry of Internal Affairs must approve all
foreign purchases of land, the lender, as a condition to extending the loan, could
require the borrower to enter an agreement concerning foreclosure with the host
government. The host government could then guarantee the lender's ability to
realize its interest in case of default. This guarantee could include provisions to
resolve disputes arising under the agreement through international arbitration. 269
In this way, the borrower assures the lender that if the lender has to foreclose, it
can do so peacefully, or else recover damages through international arbitration.27 °
Requiring the borrower to maintain an unencumbered asset base equal to the
outstanding debt on the mortgage also addresses problems associated with the
situs rule. If a lender cannot realize its interest in foreign collateral through
foreclosure proceedings, it could still make itself whole through a deficiency
action against the asset base.27' Such a requirement shifts to the borrower the
effects of a risk traditionally borne by the lender. In this way the borrower, not
the lender, would bear the risk of unfavorable foreclosure laws.
2 72
Finally, requiring the borrower to sign a deed of trust would mitigate problems
associated with the situs rule.273 A deed of trust would allow the lender to privately
foreclose on the collateral upon default. 274 However, since a deed of trust resem-
bles a mortgage, it would entail many of the same problems.275 Upon default,
268. This is especially true in Poland, where the lender might be unable to realize its interest in
the realty because the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused to issue a permit. See generally supra note
74 and accompanying text.
269. Arbitration through the ICSID would be the appropriate choice for arbitration proceedings
because the ICSID was chartered to decide disputes between a state and a company. Gaillard, supra
note 117, comments. Such is the case here. A dispute over the enforcement of an agreement allowing
foreign foreclosures is a dispute between the lender and the state.
270. The indirect nature of the relationship between a lender and the host country might call into
question the applicability of a ruling by the ICSID as a means of enforcing a guarantee for foreclosure
interests. Article 25(1) limits the jurisdiction of ICSID to disputes "arising directly out of an invest-
ment, between a Contracting State ... and a National of another Contracting State." ICSID Conven-
tion, supra note 117, art. 25(1). Perhaps the guarantee could be linked directly to the borrower with
the lender having the right to enforce it.
271. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. The laws governing the debt for which the
mortgage was given determine issues that do not affect interests in land, such as deficiency judgments.
Id. As a result, if the lender requires the borrower to maintain a predetermined asset base, the lender
can receive a deficiency judgment against this asset base if it cannot realize its interest through
foreclosure proceedings. See id.
272. The borrower should perhaps more appropriately bear this risk, since a borrower has more
direct control over the destiny of foreign property registered in its name. Additionally, the exposure
of a large asset base would increase the borrower's propensity to insure its property against direct
and indirect political risks.
273. See supra note 81.
274. Id.
275. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 80, at 591.
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proceeds from the sale of the property may not cover the balance of the loan. The
lender then would still have to seek a deficiency judgment against the borrower
to cover the outstanding balance of the loan.276 A traditional mortgage provides
this same remedy.277
III. Conclusion
Political and economic changes in Eastern Europe have encouraged western
investment. The expanding ability of foreign investors to purchase real estate in
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary provides new opportunities.
In practice, however, investors have found it difficult to capitalize on these new
opportunities.
Traditionally, western investors borrow money to purchase real estate and
pledge the property as collateral for the loan. If the borrower cannot repay the
mortgage, the lender forecloses on its equitable interest to use the land. The lender
then credits the proceeds from the sale of the property against the outstanding
balance on the loan. Unfortunately, the political and economic structures of East-
ern Europe complicate this simple process.
When evaluating the sufficiency of real collateral in Eastern Europe, lenders
must account for direct political risks such as expropriation and political violence,
indirect political risks such as repatriation limitations and adverse income tax
structures, environmental risks such as fire and natural disaster, commercial risks
such as currency devaluation and cost overruns, and legal risks such as the situs
rule. Accordingly, many lenders refuse to extend loans secured by foreign collat-
eral. In their view the risks exceed the possible rewards.
Today, however, several mechanisms are in place that increase the attrac-
tiveness of foreign collateral and promote overseas lending. Developing countries
eager to attract foreign capital have negotiated investment treaties with western
nations. International investment organizations have developed insurance and
arbitration programs. All these programs are designed to mitigate the direct and
indirect political risks faced by foreign lenders.
With cooperation, lenders and borrowers can share the burden of environmen-
tal, commercial, and legal risks inherent in overseas investing. Although these
risks are not all insurable, they are manageable. Lenders and borrowers working
together can make Eastern European investments profitable for both parties.
276. Id. the absence of antideficiency legislation that has been enacted by several jurisdictions.
Id.
277. Id.
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